In his 2007 paper "Quantum Sleeping Beauty", Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters' of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis's argument hinges on parallels between the traditional "sleeping beauty" problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the "thirder" solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis's two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian's solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis's two cases such that Lewis's argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian's or the thirder's assignment of credences.
to Beauty to make her forget this waking. If the coin flip is tails, then when Beauty awakes on Tuesday (her second waking), she does not remember having ever been awakened before. If the experimenters' coin comes up heads, Beauty is awoken just once, on Monday.
The question of interest is what credence (i.e. degree of belief) Beauty should rationally assign to the proposition "the coin landed on heads" upon awaking. 1 As Peter Lewis points out in his "Quantum Sleeping Beauty" paper, the dominant answer to this question in the sleeping beauty literature is "one third", as argued for by Elga (2000) , Dorr (2002) , and Arntzenius (2002) among others. There are those who support the "one half" answer as well, most notably Lewis (2001) , but by far the most popular intuition is that Beauty should have a credence of one third. Peter Lewis uses the nearconsensus on the sleeping beauty problem to raise an objection against the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities. Put simply, the Everett or "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that, upon measurement, a quantum mechanical superposition of a spin-up and spin-down electron, for instance, splits into two branches, one of which is characterized by a spin-up electron and one of which is characterized by a spin-down electron. Many opponents of Everett have claimed that the Everett interpretation cannot make sense of quantum mechanical probabilities; however, recent discussions of Everettian probability, such as those found in Greaves (2007) , take subjective probability and decision-theoretic axioms as central to a fully Everettian account of probability. By embracing subjective probabilities, Everettians have found a way to talk about probabilities in quantum mechanics that avoids the pitfalls of previous Everettian attempts; however, according to Peter Lewis, such an application of subjective probabilities leads to problems for the Everett interpretation.
Lewis sees parallels here between the way in which Beauty's possible-worlds successors are related to one another and the way in which an agent's many-worlds successors are related to one another in the Everett interpretation. Lewis asks us to consider three time-slices of Beauty in a world where the coin comes up "tails": the time-slice at t 0 before Beauty goes to sleep, the time-slice at t 1 when she is awoken on Monday, and the time-slice at t 2 when she is awoken on Tuesday. Lewis points out that though Beauty at t 0 is psychologically continuous with Beauty at t 1 and Beauty at t 2 , these two successors are barred from being psychologically continuous with one another by the memory drug administered to Beauty after each awakening. Likewise, in a two-branch Everettian case an agent can be treated as having a successor in each of the two post-measurement worlds who is psychologically continuous with the agent before the branching even though neither successor is psychologically continuous with the other successor.
The similarity between an agent's successors in the Everettian case and Beauty's time-slices in the sleeping beauty problem leads Lewis to posit that the rational assignment of credences in both cases should agree, but he goes on to show that such an account cannot be achieved. I present a variant of the case Lewis examines in his paper to show how the sleeping beauty and "quantum sleeping beauty" cases differ. 2 Consider Beauty's twin Qeauty, who participates in an experiment similar to Beauty's. The experimenters put Qeauty to sleep on Sunday and flip a coin. If the result of the flip is "tails", they do an x-spin measurement on an electron in a superposition of x-spin up and x-spin down (with probabilities of one half corresponding to each outcome per the Born rule). If the result of the measurement is x-spin up, they wake Qeauty on Monday then put her back to sleep. If the result of the measurement is x-spin down, they wake Qeauty on Tuesday then put her back to sleep. Finally, if the coin lands on heads, the experimenters wake Qeauty on Monday then put her back to sleep.
Assuming that Qeauty is an Everettian, her case mirrors her sister's in many ways; Qeauty in a world where tails is flipped is similar to Beauty in a world where tails is flipped by Lewis's lights: Qeauty has two successors, both of whom are psychologically continuous with pre-branching Qeauty but not psychologically continuous with each other. Likewise, Beauty has two post-Sunday successors, both of whom are psychologically continuous with Sunday Beauty but not psychologically continuous with each other because of the drug. Also, as in the Beauty case, Qeauty has self-locating uncertainty: that is, she may be on one of many branches, yet when she wakes up, she does not know which branch she is on. Given the similarities between the Beauty and Qeauty cases, Lewis's claim that the same account of probability should govern both cases seems reasonable.
If Lewis is right, one would expect that the Everettian's account of subjective probability in the Qeauty case should agree with the consensus about credences in the Beauty case. However, Lewis points out that this expectation is not met. The assessment of probability supported by Everettians, Lewis claims, requires that one take the halfer position to be the correct one in the Qeauty case; an Everettian Qeauty will treat her situation as if the probability of being awoken on Monday and the coin being tails is the same as the probability of flipping tails twice on a fair coin, or "one quarter." 3 An Everettian Qeauty will assign equal credences to her waking on a heads or tails branch, meaning that she endorses the halfer assignment of credences. Since the popular solution to the Beauty case is the thirder's, Lewis's expectation that the assigned credences in these two cases should be the same is violated. Lewis's position is that the inconsistency between these two cases poses a problem for the Everettian (i.e. both Beauty and Qeauty ought to be thirders), and so his "quantum sleeping beauty" argument provides a reason to reject the Everettian's account of probability.
Papineau and Dura-Vila (2009) raise some issues with Lewis's argument, arguing that important metaphysical differences between the Beauty and Qeauty cases make the two cases disanalogous. I agree with Papineau and Dura-Vila that there is an important distinction between Beauty's case and Qeauty's case that needs to be taken into account, but I do not think that Papineau and Dura-Vila's metaphysical charges are specific enough to pose much of a threat to Lewis's argument. My purpose in this paper is to examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between the Beauty and Qeauty cases and determine if such differences are sufficient to expect different credence assignments in these two cases. In particular, I examine diachronic Dutch book arguments which support the thirder solution to the Beauty case and the halfer solution in the Qeauty case. These Dutch book arguments, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between the two cases, and thus Lewis's argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian's or the thirder's treatment of subjective probability.
Beauty, Qeauty, and Dutch books
In his "Beauty and the Bets", Hitchcock provides what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of the thirder position for the Beauty case. 4 Hitchcock argues that a diachronic Dutch book can be made against the halfer in the traditional Sleeping Beauty case even when strict conditions are imposed on the Dutch bookie. Dutch books reveal incoherent credences at play, as one can take the existence of a Dutch book against a position as a reason to accept its alternatives. What follows is a basic reconstruction of Hitchcock's argument that shows how such a book may be constructed in Beauty's case.
Hitchcock first proposes a Dutch book against the thirder. The halfer could propose the following two bets, the first of which is taken by Beauty before falling asleep and other of which is taken by Beauty after she wakes up: A thirder Beauty will find both of these bets acceptable at the time they are suggested: her credence in heads at the time of the first bet is one half, and her credence in tails at the time of the second bet is two thirds. However, if she accepts these bets, she loses money. If the coin comes up tails, she receives $30 from Bet 2 and $0 from Bet 1, which is not enough to offset the $35 she paid for the two bets. Likewise, if the coin comes up heads, she receives $30 from Bet 1 and $0 from Bet 2, which is not enough to offset the $35 she paid for the two bets. Thus, she loses $5 no matter what, and these bets constitute a Dutch book.
Not so fast, Hitchcock says. One of the crucial assumptions made concerning the bookie in diachronic Dutch books is that he has no more information than the book-ee 4 I will not provide an argument in this paper for why Hitchcock's argument is the best one for the thirder; I take Hitchcock's "Beauty and the Bets" to provide a persuasive case for why other arguments for the thirder position are flawed when compared to Hitchcock's Dutch book arguments. I am also convinced by Lewis's (2009) own analysis which suggests that, though neither Elga-style nor D. Lewis-style arguments are conclusive, Dutch book arguments (properly construed) may decisively determine how Beauty should assign her credences. I should also note that my response to Lewis's quantum sleeping beauty problem assumes that the thirder is correct in his analysis of the sleeping beauty problem, for if such is not the case, the quantum sleeping beauty problem never arises since both Beauty and Qeauty should assign a credence of one half to the proposition that they are in a "heads-world". Even if Bradley and Leitgeb (2006) are correct and Hitchcock's books do not give one a reason to be a thirder since they are not proper Dutch books, Lewis has a separate problem from the one I discuss in this paper, namely that the thirder solution to the sleeping beauty problem no longer seems clearly superior to the halfer solution.
has (call this the "Information Rule" or "IR" of Dutch books). While this condition may not seem relevant to the above argument, consider the conditions upon which Bet 2 is taken. The above Dutch book requires that Bet 2 be given to Beauty "upon waking", but in the case where the coin lands on tails, this instruction is ambiguous since Beauty wakes twice. The bookie must only give Bet 2 to Beauty once to be assured of a profit, for if two Bet 2s are made, Beauty makes $60 while paying only $55. Therefore, the Dutch bookie must have information that Beauty doesn't (i.e. how many Bet 2s have been offered in the past) when he proposes his bets if he wants to be guaranteed to make money off of Beauty. Since the above "Dutch book" violates the IR, it is not actually a Dutch book. 5 Hitchcock suggests the following consideration so that the above mistake above does not happen again: the bookie in the sleeping beauty problem should go to sleep at the same time Beauty does, be awakened when Beauty is awakened, and be administered the same drugs Beauty takes. If these conditions are respected, the bookie will not have any information Beauty lacks. Hitchcock provides a new Dutch book argument that respects this consideration, but his argument is now against the halfer. These bets are acceptable to Beauty assuming the credences of the halfer. Now, two situations arise involving these bets. In the heads case, she pays $25 for the two bets and, because the flip was heads, she makes $20. In the tails case, Beauty takes Bet 1 once and Bet 2 twice because she awakes twice; thus, she pays $35 overall for the three bets but only makes $30 from Bet 1 . Either way, Beauty loses $5, and since the bookie has no more information than Beauty has when he proposes these bets, the above bets constitute a Dutch book against the halfer.
The fact that a Dutch book can be made against a halfer Beauty but not a thirder Beauty gives one a reason to prefer the thirder solution to the traditional sleeping beauty problem, but can it help with the Qeauty case? I argue that no Dutch book can be made against a halfer Qeauty, and thus Hitchcock's result for the Beauty case does not carry over to the Qeauty case. Let's examine the Dutch book argument against the halfer in the Beauty case to see if the same argument holds in the Qeauty case: In the heads case, Qeauty takes Bet 1 and Bet 2 once each. She pays $25 for the two bets combined and only makes $20 from Bet 2 , so she loses $5 overall. The tails case is a bit more complicated; there are two possibilities should the coin land on tails: the spin-measurement following the coin flip could yield an up or down spin result corresponding to a branch in which Qeauty is awakened on Monday and a branch where Qeauty is awakened on Tuesday, respectively. Consider the first branch: the coin flip is tails on this branch, and the spin measurement is up. Qeauty's successor is awakened only once on this branch, so she takes Bet 1 and Bet 2 once each. She pays $25 for the two bets combined but gets a payoff of $30, thus gaining $5. The down measurement case is exactly the same. Since Qeauty makes $5 if the coin lands on tails (regardless of the spin measurement outcome) and loses $5 if the coin lands on heads given this series of bets, these bets do not constitute a Dutch book. 6 Now, consider the original bets Hitchcock proposed as a "Dutch book" against the thirder Beauty: These bets did not constitute a diachronic Dutch book against the thirder in the Beauty case because they violated the IR, but no such IR-violation occurs in the Qeauty case. Consider the case in which heads is flipped. In this case, Qeauty is awakened only once, as is the bookie, and so Qeauty loses $5 if she has accepted both Bet 1 and Bet 2 (she has paid $35 and won only $30). Consider now the case in which tails is flipped and the measurement yields a value of spin-up. Qeauty takes Bet 1 and Bet 2 both exactly once, and so Qeauty loses $5 (she has paid $35 and won only $30). Likewise, the bookie's successor in the spin-down world takes Bet 1 and Bet 2 both exactly once, so the bookie makes $5 on this branch as well. Qeauty is not awakened again on any of these branches, and thus, no matter what the coin flip or spin measurement result, Qeauty's successors are awakened only once each, meaning that the bookie needs no extra information about which world (or branch) he is in to be able to propose the above Dutch book. Bets 1 and 2 constitute a Dutch book for Qeauty since the bookie can offer Beauty a series of bets she would accept which always lead to her losing money without violating the IR.
The difference
What I have shown in the previous section is the following: in the Beauty case, one has a reason to prefer the thirder solution since a diachronic Dutch book can be constructed against the halfer but not against the thirder; in the Qeauty case, however, one has a reason to prefer the halfer solution since a diachronic Dutch book can be constructed against the thirder but not the halfer. This disagreement, I believe, suggests that there is some important difference between the Beauty and Qeauty cases that provides the disanalogy Lewis claimed would be fatal to his argument, but to say that the Beauty and Qeauty cases are disanalogous simply because diachronic Dutch books can be made against different positions in these two cases would be too facile. In this section I discuss what differences between the two cases underwrite their Dutch book disagreement.
I start my analysis again with Hitchcock's "Beauty and the Bets" paper, where he identifies the crucial feature of the Beauty setup that leads to the Dutch book argument against the halfer: "Thus the actual number of awakenings that occurs in the two different outcomes does play a central role in the solution to the problem" (415). Hitchcock's analysis here seems right; what made Beauty's Dutch book against the halfer work was the fact that one coin flip outcome leads to a different number of awakenings than the other coin flip outcome. In the Dutch book against the halfer Beauty, the "tails" case of these bets yields a $5 payoff to the bookie because Bet 1 is made only once while Bet 2 is made twice. In the Qeauty analogue, however, each bet is made only once. This difference in the number of awakenings between the cases might seem strange; after all, Lewis has provided grounds on which to expect Everettian branching to behave like taking the forgetfulness drug in the Beauty case. However, what Lewis failed to take into account was that each Everettian branch is causally isolated from the other branches; that is, there is a metaphysical difference between the two cases.
This metaphysical difference can be understood in many ways: one could cash out the difference in terms of causality (or at the very least counterfactuals) since Beauty's two tails-successors are causally connected while Qeauty's two tails-successors are causally isolated. One other option would be to express this difference in terms of identity: on the tails branch, Monday-waking Beauty is the same person as Tuesday-waking Beauty, and the latter is the successor of the former; however, Qeauty's tails-successors are not properly regarded as identical, nor is either the successor of the other. Finally, one could understand this metaphysical difference in terms of independence of events. Beauty's Monday-waking and Tuesday-waking on the tails branch are not properly independent events: one can happen only if the other happens. However, in the Qeauty cases, the Monday-waking and Tuesday-waking events on the tails branch are as independent from each other as they are from the Tuesday-waking event on the heads branch. 7 I believe any of these ways of understanding the metaphysical difference between the Beauty and Qeauty cases is valid, and, depending on one's stance on various issues in metaphysics, several of these differences may be equivalent; however, Lewis asked for a salient epistemological difference between the cases, and so, before ending my discussion, I must provide such a difference. Consider the kinds of uncertainty that both Beauty and Qeauty are faced with when they wake up; that is, what kinds of self-locating uncertainty they have to deal with. Beauty is uncertain of what the coin flip result was and what day it is, but she is uncertain of whether she's been awakened before as well. Qeauty, like Beauty, is also uncertain of what day it is and what the coin flip result was (and, what's more, she's even uncertain of the spin-measurement outcome), but she is certain that she has never been awakened before. No matter what branch Qeauty wakes on, she knows that this waking event is both her first and her last for the duration of the experiment. Thus, the fact that Beauty is uncertain about whether she's been awakened before when she awakes indicates an epistemic difference between her case and the case of Qeauty, who knows that she will only be awakened once on each branch.
So what should the Everettian's response to Lewis be? It should be something like this: in the Beauty case, the thirder's position seems correct; however, were the situation to involve not one person waking up twice but two successors being awoken once each, as Everettians take the Qeauty case to involve, the halfer solution would be the correct one. Thus, from the fact that the thirder solution holds in the Beauty case, it does not follow that the thirder solution is correct in the Qeauty case as well.
Conclusion
Convincing though Lewis's quantum sleeping beauty argument may seem at first, it hinges on the parallels between what I have called the Beauty and Qeauty cases. These parallels are swamped out by differences between the two cases, which are indicated by the diachronic Dutch books that may be made against a halfer Beauty and a thirder Qeauty. These Dutch books are indicative of various metaphysical and epistemological differences between the two cases and provide ample motivation to reject Lewis's analogy; thus, despite Lewis's claims, the quantum sleeping beauty case does not reveal inconsistencies in the Everettian's treatment of subjective probability.
